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This paper identifies critical modeling choices, as well as differences in the driving forces 
behind offshoring, that may explain differences in results. Offshoring of industry-specific 
tasks has wage and employment effects that are vastly different from those identified in 
Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006), depending on how the industries differ in their average 
and marginal skill-intensities, respectively. Structural adjustment may occur at the intensive 
margin and the extensive margin (offshoring), and it may occur in opposite directions or the 
same direction at both margins, again depending on how industries differ in terms of their 
average and marginal skill-intensity. 
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It is now almost 20 years since Jones & Kierzkowski (1990) have ￿rst pointed out the
emergence of a new trend in globalization that was made possible mainly because of
advances in the technology of transportation and communication: the fragmentation of
production across borders. In the 1990s, this phenomenon became known as outsourcing.
Krugman (1995) was the ￿rst to argue that an increased tendency towards outsourcing
could be a partial explanation for the rising skill-premium in wages observed to a varying
degree in many advanced industrial countries. Feenstra & Hanson (1997) were the ￿rst
to o⁄er a theoretical model for this type of explanation, with the important property
that outsourcing would lead to the same e⁄ect on the skill-premium in both, the ￿North￿
(where outsourcing takes place) and the ￿South￿(the target country of such outsourcing
activities). Subsequently, a sizable literature has developed, focusing either on the spe-
ci￿c conditions that favor outsourcing, or on the e⁄ects that it has on the outsourcing
country￿ s wages, employment and welfare. In this process the terminology has undergone
certain changes, whereby outsourcing relates to procurement via market-based transac-
tions versus ￿in-house￿operation of a given stage of the production process. What was
originally called international fragmentation or outsourcing is now commonly referred to
as o⁄shoring, meaning that ￿rms delocalize certain production-stages to other countries
in order to arbitrage on international factor-cost di⁄erences. Obviously this can either
happen through an ￿in-house￿operation, or through cross-border outsourcing.
Empirical measurement of o⁄shoring notoriously su⁄ers from certain problems of pre-
cise de￿nition and data limits, but it is probably fair to conclude from existing studies
that the quantitative signi￿cance of o⁄shoring is relatively low, at least below what would
justify the enormous attention that o⁄shoring has dawn in the policy debate; see for in-
stance Bhagwati et al. (2004). More recently, this attention has even increased, due to
evidence that the practice of o⁄shoring is by no means restricted to production stages
intensive in low-skilled-labor and requiring relatively little high-skilled labor. Several au-
thors have been arguing that much of the additional o⁄shoring to be expected for the
future will probably a⁄ect high-skilled workers much more than was the case in the past,
maybe even more than low-skilled labor; see for instance Markusen (2006) and Blinder
(2006).
From existing empirical studies, it is relatively easy to quote both, numbers that por-
1tray o⁄shoring as a relatively minor phenomenon, and numbers suggesting that it marks
a major shift in international trade. In a recent study, the OECD calculates a country-
speci￿c index of o⁄shoring, based on the share of imported non-energy intermediate inputs
in various industries￿total use of non-energy intermediates. On this account, the smaller
European countries, like Belgium, Austria and Denmark, reveal a high level of o⁄shoring,
with index-values for 2000 in the vicinity of 0.7.1 Large countries like Japan and the US,
however, appear much less prone to o⁄shoring, with index-values well below 0.2. In all
countries considered, the o⁄shoring-index for 2000 is larger than for 1995, although growth
rates rarely exceed 20 percent. Interestingly, the index values are largest for manufactur-
ing intermediates in manufacturing industries, about 7 to 8 times the values for service
intermediates and service industries. However, such indices have very limited information
content. They certainly cover much more than would be considered as o⁄shoring in theo-
retical analyses, or in the policy debate. Moreover, inter-country comparisons make little
sense, since they do not control for gravity-type e⁄ects.
Some authors have looked directly at jobs reported to have fallen victim to o⁄shoring,
which seems much closer to the notion of o⁄shoring, although there￿ s bound to be some
blur. Relating the number of such job losses to aggregate job losses over the relevant
period (early 2000s) and in the countries considered (mostly the US), o⁄shoring seems
like a minor nuisance: In three of the four studies reported in OECD (2007), o⁄shoring
was involved in no more than 1 percent of the job losses.2 The EU has investigated
job losses in a detailed analysis of 3.475 cases of industrial restructuring that took place
in various member countries between 2003 and 2006. O⁄shoring to countries outside
the EU has turned out as an ingredient of restructuring in 10 percent of the cases, and
responsible for about 8 percent of the announced job losses. This suggests a somewhat
bigger importance, but the authors still conclude that the scale of o⁄shoring is ￿smaller
than might be expected￿ . Interestingly, there is no evidence from this exercise that the
phenomenon has gained importance during the years. But it is di¢ cult to say what such
numbers might tell us. May we conclude that all the discussion about o⁄shoring is ￿much
ado￿about next to nothing? Or do these ￿gures simply re￿ ect an underutilized, but large
1An index value of 0.7 means that on average a country￿ s industries are estimated to rely on
imports for 70 percent of their non-energy intermediate inputs; see OECD (2007, pp 61).
2A similar conclusion emerges from Belessiotis, Levin & Veugelers (2007).
2potential?
A number of consultancies have ventured to estimate the jobs likely to be moved
o⁄shore. The numbers appear somewhat more impressive, between 1 and 9 percent of
the estimated aggregate job losses, although still di¢ cult to interpret without a clear
benchmark. Taking a broader perspective, some others have even ventured to estimate
the number of jobs that could potentially be moved o⁄shore, mostly for the US. Expressing
job losses as a percent of the relevant employment ￿gure, o⁄shoring now looks a more
intimidating spectre, causing layo⁄s between 10 and 25 percent of employment.3
If there is substantial disagreement about the quantitative signi￿cance of the phe-
nomenon itself, this is aggravated by ambiguous messages about its e⁄ects. From an
economic policy perspective, three dimension seem important. One is welfare, the ques-
tion of whether we may view o⁄shoring as a phenomenon that enhances the gains from
trade. The second is distribution, the main concern being its e⁄ect on domestic wages
in the o⁄shoring country. And ￿nally, there is concern about displacement e⁄ects in
industries where o⁄shoring is observed. Economic theory suggests that the three dimen-
sions are closely interrelated, but empirical studies have tended to focus on single aspects,
mainly looking at either wage or employment e⁄ects. Unfortunately, however, the stories
presented di⁄er widely.4 In very broad terms, there are two reasons for this. One has
to do with the ambiguity regarding measurement of o⁄shoring itself; see the preceding
paragraph. The second has to do with the lack of clear guidance from theory as to how,
exactly, estimation equations should be speci￿ed. Both problems, particularly the second,
are familiar from the literature on trade and wages.
There are two principal modeling approaches to o⁄shoring. One is to follow traditional
trade theory, using general equilibrium models. These models may in turn be Ricardian
or Heckscher-Ohlin in nature, taking a long-run view on comparative advantage, or they
may be more short-run in nature, assuming factor speci￿city as in the Ricardo-Viner
model.5 The strengths of these models is their ability to address welfare and distribu-
3See OECD (2007, p.90). Blinder (2006) is particularly outspoken in identifying a large
potential for o⁄shoring, particularly in high-skilled-labor intensive tasks.
4A convenient survey is found in Belessiotis et al. (2006). See also Kohler (2007).
5This type of literature essentially goes back to Jones & Kierzkowski (1990). Important
contributions are Feenstra & Hanson (1997), Jones (2000), Jones & Kierzkowski (2001a,2001b),
3tional concerns, which also seem to dominate the policy debate. This approach views
o⁄shoring as a result of some exogenous change in the cost of cross-border linking of
production stages (cost of transportation and/or communication across distance and ju-
risdictions), which allows for a ￿ner exploitation of cross country di⁄erences in the factor
cost of performing di⁄erent tasks in production. Such costs will in general also relate to
the organizational mode of doing things, such as arms-length transactions versus intra-
￿rm transactions. However, in this ￿rst approach, these costs are typically treated as a
￿ black box￿ . In contrast, the second approach to analyzing o⁄shoring is to open this box,
thereby also shedding light on the nature of transactional problems that are responsible
for whether ￿rms chose one mode of sourcing over another, in addition to determining
where to source their inputs or tasks of production.6 Typically, however, models in this
tradition are somewhat short on factor price e⁄ects and distribution, which is arguably a
dominating concern of the policy debate.
In this paper, the focus lies squarely on the ￿rst approach which places much emphasis
on factor-cost considerations behind o⁄shoring, and on general equilibrium repercussions,
but which takes a very simple view on the transaction-costs of o⁄shoring, and which
largely remains silent about the particular organizational form in which o⁄shoring might
take place. The results derived obtain independently on the speci￿c organizational form.
The model proposed is inspired by the Heckscher-Ohlin model of comparative advantage
and trade. The purpose of the analysis is to shed light on the three di⁄erent issues
that have been addressed in the empirical literature, and the di⁄ering stories that exist
where it has sometimes been di¢ cult to interpret the results obtained, largely for lack
of a lucid theoretical exposition of the e⁄ects in question. The ￿rst issue relates to
the so-called productivity e⁄ect of o⁄shoring. The second relates to the wage (or more
generally factor price) e⁄ects of o⁄shoring. And the third relates to employment (or
more generally reallocation) e⁄ects of o⁄shoring. The model will show that o⁄shoring
does indeed incorporate something like a productivity e⁄ect. It drives the gains from
Deardor⁄ (2001a,2001b,2005), Kohler (2003,2004b), and Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006),
which are all inspired by the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Kohler (2001,2004b) and Bhagwati et al.
(2004) take a Ricardo-Viner perspective.
6Important contributions to this type of literature are McLaren (2000), Grossman & Helpman
(2002,2005) and Antras & Helpman (2004).
4o⁄shoring that many economists almost routinely emphasize when discussing the virtue
of o⁄shoring, alluding to the general principle of gains from trade. However, the model
also suggests that (and explains why) empirical studies should have a hard time identifying
such productivity e⁄ects. As to the factor price and employment e⁄ects, the model will
reveal that the a-priori intuition that inspires much of the empirical work ex ante, and is
usually invoked ex post in order to interpret the results obtained, is potentially misleading.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two presents a simple two-sector model
where production takes place in a continuum of production stages, or tasks, each relying
on high- and low-skilled labor, respectively, with a varying skill-intensity which is assumed
to be given (Leontief-type technology). I describe the extensive margin of o⁄shoring as
an endogenous variable. O⁄shoring is driven by juxtaposing the factor cost-advantage
of some foreign location where low-skilled labor is relatively cheap, and the extra cost of
connecting production stages towards ￿nal goods production. I also introduce the concept
of marginal skill intensity of an industry, marginal meaning at the extensive margin of
o⁄shoring, and the average skill intensity across the entire range of domestic tasks. Section
three then turns to a general equilibrium analysis of a simple scenario which involves a
reduction of the o⁄shoring cost. Importantly, this is allowed to happen independently
in both industries. I shall explore in some detail a key di⁄erence that arises between
two di⁄erent fundamental views of o⁄shoring. One views o⁄shoring as an input-related
phenomenon, by de￿nition applying to all industries at the same time, while the other
views o⁄shoring as a phenomenon which is idiosyncratic for each industry, and which
always a⁄ects both types of labor within the industry. The former concept is used in the
recent paper by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006), whereas the latter has been used
by Kohler (2003) and Kohler (2004b). It turns out that the wage e⁄ects of a reduction
in the cost of o⁄shoring are dramatically di⁄erent for the two modes of o⁄shoring. In
section four, I explore a scenario where domestic industries respond to a change in ￿nal
goods prices, given exogenously from world markets. Does an industry contract or expand
simultaneously at the intensive margin (meaning contraction or expansion of all existing
domestic tasks), and at the extensive margin (meaning an expansion or reduction in the
measure of tasks performed domestically, as opposed to o⁄shore)? I introduce a concept
of skill-intensity-di⁄erence between industries that allows us to tell whether an industry
moves in the same direction on both margins, or whether industries expand (contract)
at the intensive margin, while contracting (expanding) at the extensive margin. Again,
5it will turn out that the two concepts of o⁄shoring hold di⁄erent messages. In section
￿ve I shall draw some conclusions, with special emphasis on implications for empirical
modeling.
2 A Simple Model
Any model of o⁄shoring requires to be explicit about the way in which a certain production
process may be decomposed, or fragmented, such that various parts may take place at
two di⁄erent locations (countries) featuring di⁄erent factor costs. Factor costs may be
di⁄erent in two countries either because they have di⁄erent technologies, or because they
have di⁄erent factor prices. I focus on factor price di⁄erences as determinants of factor
cost advantages, although I do allow for technology di⁄erences to play a role as well.
As regards factor cost, I assume that there is a foreign economy with given wage rates
for high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor, respectively, denoted by ￿ wh and ￿ wl. I thus
assume a two-factor setup with high-skilled and low-skilled labor as the only inputs. Labor
endowments are considered as given exogenously for the larger part of my analysis.7
I also assume two ￿nal goods, where production is assumed to require a continuum
of tasks, each requiring inputs of the two types of labor in a certain ratio, according to
a Leontief-type production relationship. It will become evident that the model could be
generalized to allow for factor substitution with relatively little e⁄ort, but since there are
almost zero gains from doing so I stick to the Leontief-case. I use aih(j) and ail(j) to denote
the ￿xed input coe¢ cients ￿per unit￿of task j in production of good i.8 The continuous
variable j 2 [0;1] is used to index tasks, and i = f1;2g is used to index the two goods,
or industries. Moreover, fi(j) denotes the ￿amount￿of task j that is required per unit of
7The model is inspired by Dornbusch, Fischer & Samuelson (1980), Dixit & Grossman (1982),
Feenstra & Hanson (1997), and the recent contribution by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006).
See also Kohler (2004). The distinctive features of the model used here will be emphasized as I
go along.
8Due to Grossman & Roossi-Hansberg (2006), it has now become standard to talk of tasks,
where earlier literature has referred to stages of production, or fragments. Likewise, it has
become costumary to use o⁄shoring to describe foreign (as opposed to domestic) sourcing of
tasks, leaving the precise mode of sourcing indetermined (in-house or outsourcing).
6good i. Thus technology is also of the Leontief-type regarding the tasks, in addition to the
types of labor used for each task. Essentially, fi(j) measures inverse task-productivities,
or the ￿importance￿of di⁄erent tasks in production, across the continuum of tasks from
j = 0 to j = 1. By appropriate scaling of output-units, I assume a unitary measure
of tasks, i.e.,
R 1
0 fi(j)dj = 1. Notice that this does not imply a uniform distribution
of inverse task-productivities (or importance) across j. Using wh and wl to denote the
domestic economy￿ s wage rate for high- and low-skilled labor, respectively, the factor-cost




fi(j)[aih(j)wh + ail(j)wl]dj (1)
Suppose now that there is a technology of linking tasks across distance. More speci￿-
cally, if the home economy produces good i with some of the tasks performed in the other
country, then the ￿amount￿of task j that needs to be performed by foreign labor, in order
to secure availability of an equivalent to fi(j) domestic tasks, is ti(j)fi(j), where ti(j) > 1
is allowed to vary across tasks, di⁄erently across industries. This employs the notion of
iceberg-cost to o⁄shoring, capturing all costs involved in ￿gluing￿tasks across locations.9
We do not dwell on details here, other than the fact that these costs vary across tasks.
We now de￿ne
￿i(wh;wl;j) := [aih(j)wh + ail(j)wl]/[aih(j)￿ wh + ail(j)￿ wl] (2)
as a measure of the factor cost of o⁄shoring that derives from the factor intensity of tasks
and the factor price di⁄erence between the domestic and the foreign economy. We know
from multiple-good-versions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory that ranking tasks in such a
way that aih(j)=ail(j) is weakly increasing in j for both goods implies monotonicity of
￿i(￿;j) in j. More speci￿cally, for wh=wl > ￿ wh=￿ wl the factor-cost-advantage ￿i(￿;j) is
non-increasing in j, and vice versa for wh=wl < ￿ wh=￿ wl.10 For wh=wl = ￿ wh=￿ wl, ￿i does not
depend on j. We denote this level of ￿i level by ￿ ￿i. If ￿ ￿i > 1, this indicates an across-
the-board absolute cost advantage of the foreign economy. Without loss of generality we
may normalize ￿ ￿i = 1.
9See Baldwin (2006b). Jones & Kierzkowski (2005) call this the ￿extra cost of service link
activities￿ .
10See Jones (1956) and Dornbusch, Fischer & Samuelson (1980).
7Cost-minimization requires that ￿rms delocalize a task j, if [aih(j)wh + ail(j)wl] >
[aih(j)￿ wh + ail(j)￿ wl]ti(j), i.e., if ￿i(wh;wl;j)/ti(j) > 1. There is a unique cut-o⁄ point
separating tasks where cost-minimization dictates delocalization, or o⁄shoring, and tasks
to be performed domestically, provided that ￿i(wh;wl;j)/ti(j) is strongly monotonic in
j. A convenient assumption often made is that it strongly decreases in j. The usual
interpretation is that wh=wl > ￿ wh=￿ wl and the cost of o⁄shoring, ti(j), rises in j, or at
least that ￿i(wh;wl;j)/ti(j) inherits the factor-cost-based monotonicity from ￿i(wh;wl;j).
However, this may seem questionable. It is not the skill-intensity of a task per se that
makes it more or less ￿o⁄shorable￿ , but the degree to which it may be described in
algorithmic terms, or the degree to which it requires face-to-face contact or complex
communication. As argued by Blinder (2005,2007a,2007b) and others, it is by no means
clear that ranking tasks in terms of ￿gluing-cost￿replicates the ranking in terms of skill-
intensity. Unless stated otherwise, In what follows I assume that there is a rank-order of
tasks such that ￿i(wh;wl;j)/ti(j) decreases monotonically in j, and that this rank order
also implies that aih(j)=ail(j) is rising in j.
I now denote the cost-minimizing cut-o⁄ value of j that satis￿es
￿i(wh;wl;j)/ti(j) = 1 (3)
by j￿
i (wh;wl).11 In Kohler (2004b,2007) I have called this the extensive margin of o⁄-
shoring. It obviously depends on domestic factor prices. The cut-o⁄ level j￿
i satis￿es the
￿rst￿ order-condition for the unit-cost with o⁄shoring, i.e.,
~ ci(wh;wl;j) : =
Z j
0




fi(k)[aih(k)wh + ail(k)wl]dk (4)
with respect to j. This ￿rst￿ order-condition simply requires ￿i(wh;wl;j)/ti(j) = 1,
and the second￿ order-condition is satis￿ed from the aforementioned monotonicity. It is
instructive to consider the partial equilibrium comparative statics of j￿
i , holding factor
prices constant. Thus, consider the case where ti(j) = ￿izi(j), and let there be an
exogenous change ￿￿i < 0. For given domestic wages, this results in an increase in j￿
i
11This corresponds to the condition (w=w￿)=[￿t(I)] = 1 in Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg
(2006b).
8which we could derive from the di⁄erential of the ￿rst￿ order-condition on j￿
i . Intuitively,
the ￿ atter ￿i(wh;wl;j)/ti(j) with respect to j, the stronger the reaction of the extensive
margin of o⁄shoring. In turn, a relatively ￿ at schedule may arise from a ￿ at factor intensity
ranking, meaning a relatively homogeneous set of tasks, and/or a ￿ at ti(j)-schedule. We
might call such an industry relatively sensitive with respect to o⁄shoring.
We may also explore o⁄shoring e⁄ects of changes in factor prices. Any domestic wage
change that increases costs at the marginal stage of production, aih(j￿
i )dwh+ail(j￿
i )dwl >
0, makes the domestic economy uncompetitive at the margin and leads ￿rms to delocalize
further stages until the condition ￿i(wh;wl;j)/ti(j) = 1 is reached. The opposite holds
true for wage changes that satisfy aih(j￿
i )dwh+ail(j￿
i )dwl < 0. Any factor price change that
satis￿es aih(j￿
i )dwh + ail(j￿
i )dwl = 0 leaves the extensive margin of o⁄shoring una⁄ected.
This property will be important when we consider how o⁄shoring behaves in the process
of industrial restructuring.
The schedule j￿
i (wh;wl) describes o⁄shoring behavior of industry i, independently on
the price of its output, because o⁄shoring is purely a matter of cost-minimization. Given
our assumptions, there is a lower bound of wl=wh for which j￿
i = 0, and an upper bound
for j￿
i = 1. Industries may obviously di⁄er in their o⁄shoring characteristics, and the
schedule j￿
i (wh;wl) is a convenient way of describing these characteristic. For the sake of
a simpler notation, I have abstained from indicating that j￿
i is also a function of foreign
wage rates which we treat as parametric throughout this paper.
It will prove convenient to introduce the distinction between the marginal and the
average domestic skill intensity of an industry. The marginal skill-intensity is denoted by
￿i(wh;wl) := aih [j￿
i (wh;wl)]=ail [j￿
i (wh;wl)]; while the average skill-intensity is denoted





ais(j)fi(j)dj for s = h;l (5)
The complementary de￿nition of the average skill intensity of the delocalized part of





ais(j)ti(j)fi(j)dj for s = h;l (6)
Of course, the di⁄erence between the marginal and the average skill intensity vanishes
9as j￿
i approaches 1. Note that the coe¢ cients ais are constant by assumption, While ￿ ais
depends on domestic wages through the ￿rst-order condition on j￿
i .
With these de￿nitions, we may now move from the partial industry perspective to
general equilibrium. We look at a small open economy facing given world prices p1 and
p2 for the two goods. With o⁄shoring, the zero-pro￿t-conditions are
pi ￿ [￿ aih(wh;wl)￿ wh + ￿ ail(wh;wl)￿ wl] ￿ ~ aih(wh;wl)wh + ~ ail(wh;wl)wl for i = 1;2 (7)
with equality if there is any remaining home production in industry i: In line with the
theory of e⁄ective protection, we may call the left-hand side of (7) the e⁄ective price for
the domestic value added in industry i.12 Denoting this e⁄ective price by ￿i(pi;wh;wl);
we arrive at conventional zero-pro￿t-conditions of the following form:
￿i(pi;wh;wl) ￿ ~ aih(wh;wl)wh + ~ ail(wh;wl)wl for i = 1;2 (8)
again with equality if industry i is at least partly viable domestically, meaning j￿
i (wh;wl) <
1. The key di⁄erence to the conventional zero-pro￿t-condition is that instead of the price
pi we now have an e⁄ective price, which depends on domestic wage rates. It also depends
on the technology of o⁄shoring, ti(j), which enters through the extensive margin j￿
i ; as
well as through the function ti(j) in the integral (6).
It must be re-emphasized that the condition governing the extensive margin of frag-
mentation is in￿ uenced by the given wage rates in the forgeign economy. In general equi-
librium, these zero-pro￿t-conditions must be satis￿ed simultaneously for all industries. In
addition, equilibrium requires full employment
￿ a1s(wh;wl)y1 + ￿ a2s(wh;wl)y2 = Ls for s = h;l (9)
Equations (7) and (9) determine the two domestic wage rates as well as the ￿gross-size￿
of the two industries, y1 and y2. The o⁄shoring-schedules j￿
i (wh;wl) then determine the
degree of delocalization in production of the two industries.
12I have introduced this concept in Kohler (2003); see also Kohler (2004b and 2007).
103 Gobalization: The Good of It
I now proceed to comparative static analysis. First, I consider the oft-quoted story of
a ￿more global village￿ , which in the present modeling setup amounts to a reduction of
ti(j). As Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006b) have emphasized, for this scenario to have
interesting e⁄ects, one must assume o⁄shoring to be present in the initial equilibrium.
This generates infra-marginal e⁄ects. I assume that the cost of service link activities
obey ti(j) = ￿izi(j); and I assume ^ ￿i := ￿￿i/￿i < 0. Hence, globalization increases the
ease with which o⁄shoring may take place across the board for all tasks involved in any
one industry. I call it the ￿good of globalization￿ , since it involves a true cost-saving, a
reduction in real o⁄shoring-cost. In the next section, I will turn to a somewhat less benign
form in which globalization presents itself, which is simply a fall in world-market prices
of traded goods. However, I want to allow for ^ ￿1 6= ^ ￿2. This is a crucial point, much less
innocuous than may appear at ￿rst sight. It has to do with a fundamental property of
our o⁄shoring technology, and a property which separates this model from Grossman &
Rossi-Hansberg (2006). It warrants a brief digression.
In this model, o⁄shoring is an industry-speci￿c phenomenon, relating to the idio-
syncratic way in which the value added process of a certain industry may be sliced up,
or fragmented, into di⁄erent tasks. Each task, the smallest possible unit of the value
added process, requires composite labor according to a Leontief-type technology. Ac-
cordingly, the ￿gluing-cost￿for delocalized tasks are also an idiosyncratic element of an
industry￿ s technology. Any improvement in this glue (globalization scenario) is thus also
an industry-speci￿c element, but within the industry it a⁄ects all types of labor directly.
Other industries may be a⁄ected indirectly through general equilibrium repercussions.
By way of contrast, Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006) de￿ne o⁄shoring as an input-
speci￿c phenomenon, whereby the term input directly relates to a certain type of labor. If
globalization allows easier gluing of input-speci￿c tasks performed at di⁄erent locations,
then this directly a⁄ects all industries using this input, but it does not directly a⁄ect
other tasks. Indeed, they are not a⁄ected indirectly, as we shall see below.
These are two fundamentally di⁄erent perceptions of what o⁄shoring is all about.
Both seem to have some merits empirically. The di⁄erence between them in terms of
formal analysis is best illustrated in the present context if we make a further simplifying
assumption. Let me thus assume that the input-coe¢ cients for high-skilled and low-skilled
11labor are the same across tasks, i.e, ais(j) = ais for s = h;l and i = 1;2. This assumption,
also made by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006), is enormously helpful analytically, since
it allows us to substitute for foreign factor-cost, using the ￿rst￿ order-condition on the
extensive margin j￿
i , which now reads as





Notice that we have now replaced ti(j) = ￿izi(j). I still denote the endogenous margin
of o⁄shoring by the schedule j￿
i (wh;wl); which depends parametrically on foreign wages
￿ wh and ￿ wl. Replacing accordingly in (5) and (6), we obtain the following zero-pro￿t-
conditions:
pi = (aihwh + ailwl)Si [j
￿
i (wh;wl)] for i = 1;2 (11)
where Si [j
￿












The schedule Si [j￿
i (wh;wl)] captures how changes in the technology of o⁄shoring a⁄ect the
total factor cost of industry i through a change in the cost-minimizing extensive margin
j￿
i . A number of things are worth emphasizing about this.13 Due to the second￿ order-
condition on j￿
i , we have Si < 1, which re￿ ects the simple fact that o⁄shoring leads to a
net savings on factor cost. Moreover, note that the shift parameters ￿i have disappeared
through substitution, which may seem counter-intuitive. However, they still play a role
through determining the equilibrium margins of o⁄shoring in the two industries, j￿
1 and
j￿
2. It is obvious that S0
i < 0, and I use !i := S0
ij￿
i /Si < 0 to denote the elasticity of the
￿o⁄shoring-savings-factor￿Si with respect to j￿
i . And ￿nally, for j￿
i = 0 we have Si = 1,
due to the assumed unitary measure of fi(j).








￿ih ^ wh + ￿il ^ wl ￿ ^ ￿i
￿
(13)
where ￿i := z0
iji/zi > 0 denotes the elasticity of the ￿gluing-cost￿function zi(j), which
now drives all movements at the extensive margin, due to the assumption of otherwise
13This discussion relies on Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006). For a comparison of results
see below.
12homogeneous tasks. Note that this elasticity is evaluated at the initial equilibrium value
of j￿
i . I use ￿is to denote the cost-share of factor s, as usual. Assuming a small country
facing constant ￿nal goods prices p, the zero pro￿t conditions 11) imply
￿ih ^ wh + ￿il ^ wl + !i^ |
￿
i = 0 (14)
Combining these two equations, our globalization scenario now emerges as
!i
￿i + !i
^ ￿i = (￿ih ^ wh + ￿il ^ wl) for i = 1;2 (15)
At ￿rst sight, the comparative statics may seem ambiguous, since ￿i > 0 and !i < 0 are of
opposite signs. However, these two elasticities are intimately related to each other, and it
is relatively straightforward from plain intuition that ￿i > j!ij. The elasticity ￿i measures
the extent to which expanding the scope of o⁄shoring increases the marginal o⁄shoring-
cost zi(j). The elasticity !i measures the extent to which doing so increases the entire
factor cost savings from o⁄shoring, relative to all-home-production, measured through the
￿o⁄shoring-savings-factor￿Si < 1. Both elasticities are evaluated for equilibrium values
where the ￿rst-order-condition on j￿
i is satis￿ed. This condition requires that the marginal
e⁄ects would just o⁄set each other, but since Si includes the infra-marginal savings e⁄ects
which are smaller (due to the assumption that ￿
0
i(j) > 0), the marginal e⁄ect measured by
￿i must dominate the e⁄ect on Si in absolute value: ￿i > j!ij, whence !i /(￿i + !i) < 0. It
should be noticed that the left hand side of (15) is the percentage increase of the e⁄ective
price, as de￿ned in (8), that is brought about by a ^ ￿i-percent reduction in the o⁄shoring
cost. Thus, the productivity e⁄ects may equivalently be expressed as an increase in the
e⁄ective price14
Equation (15) is intuitive, both directly and also from the notion of an e⁄ective price
change. If ￿rms in a certain industry already engage in o⁄shoring, i.e., if j￿
i > 0, any across
the board reduction in ￿gluing-costs￿through ^ ￿i < 0 acts just like an increase in the price
of the good, given that !i /(￿i + !i) < 0, as demonstrated before.15 An alternative way to
describe the same e⁄ect is to say that o⁄shoring makes domestic factors used in an industry
uniformly more productive. The strength of the e⁄ect depends on how far the industry
14I have emphasized this perspective already in Kohler (2003,2004), but without o⁄ering an
explicit solution for ^ ￿i.
15See Kohler (2003) where I have ￿rst pointed out that o⁄shoring may be seen in this way.
13has already gone in terms of the scope of o⁄shoring. This is because of the inframarginal
e⁄ect of making all those tasks cheaper to obtain that have already been sourced abroad,
prior to the fall in ￿i. If fi(j) is uniform, this e⁄ect is measured through the margin j￿
i
alone. If fi(j) varies across j, meaning that some tasks are inherently more important
for production than others, then this e⁄ect is the larger, the more important the tasks
that have been delocalized to start with. Moreover, the strength of the e⁄ect depends on
the steepness of the zi(j)-schedule. Taken together, the strength of this equivalent-price-
increase for a given size of the shock is given through the term !i /(￿i + !i) < 0.
As regards the general equilibrium e⁄ects, we may now invoke Stolper-Samuelson logic
to pin down the wage e⁄ects of o⁄shoring, provided that the economy is and remains
diversi￿ed. The diversi￿cation condition matters because any change in j￿
i also a⁄ects the
full employment conditions, since less domestic labor is now used to generate outputs y1
and y2. Under our assumption of constant input coe¢ cients across all tasks, both types
of labor are a⁄ected symmetrically. O⁄shoring just acts like a sector-biased technological
change, which may be equivalently be treated as an e⁄ective change in the supply of both
types of labor. In our case, this happens in a disproportional way, but as long as this does
not push the economy outside its cone of diversi￿cation, the wage e⁄ects are determined
in the familiar way from the zero-pro￿t-conditions alone.
With a view on the fundamental distinction between two di⁄erent concepts of o⁄-
shoring introduced above, it should now be instructive to compare this expression with
the corresponding result in Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006). To have a meaningful
comparison, we need to look at the more general case where they allow for trade in tasks
for both low- and high-skilled labor. For this case, their zero-pro￿t-conditions read as (in
terms of our notation)
pi = aihwhSh [j
￿
h(wh)] + ailwlSl [j
￿
l (wl)] for i = 1;2 (16)
where Ss is de￿ned by analogy to (12), the only di⁄erence being that they assume fs(j)
to be uniform with measure 1, now relating to input s = fh;lg, and not to industry
i = f1;2g, as in our model. The comparative statics on j￿




^ ws ￿ ^ ￿s
￿.
￿s, where ￿s is de￿ned by analogy to ￿i above. For constant goods prices
pi the two equations (16) uniquely determine equilibrium domestic factor costs for each of
the two factors, high- and low-skilled labor, whSh [j￿
h(wh)] and wlSl [j￿
l (wl)], respectively.
Hence, comparative statics must obey ^ ws = ^ Ss, independently for both s = h and s = l.
14O⁄shoring of the two types of tasks takes place with no connection whatsoever between
these two phenomena.16 This is a stark separation property for input-speci￿c o⁄shoring
which, obviously, does not hold for industry-speci￿c o⁄shoring.
What are the conclusions to be drawn from this analysis? A ￿rst point to be made in
view of the counter-intuitive results that I have emphasized in Kohler (2003) and Kohler
(2007) is that these are ruled out here because of the continuity imposed on o⁄shoring
through assuming a continuum of tasks. The above analysis looks at small changes where
all ￿pathologies￿behind counter-intuitive results are ruled out.
However, with a view on the empirical literature it must still be emphasized that some
of the direct intuition often invoked is misleading. As has often been pointed out by
trade economists in the debate about ￿trade and wages￿ , in open economies wages are
determined by prices through the zero-pro￿t-conditions, more than by quantities ￿ say
quantities traded. In the present context a similar point obtains for o⁄shoring. More
speci￿cally, we may have an industry where in a given period (sample) a lot of action
takes place in terms of going o⁄shore, and we may be con￿dent that it is all a story
about ^ ￿i < 0. Yet, if this happens at a ￿young age￿of o⁄shoring, with j￿
i close to zero
at the outset, then we should not be surprised to ￿nd small e⁄ects on wages. In other
words, when we estimate the role of o⁄shoring through an empirical implementation of
zero-pro￿t-conditions like (15) above, we should also attempt to observe, by whatever
proxi might be available, the terms !i /(￿i + !i) across industries.
And it does matter from the above whether o⁄shoring is of one or the other type,
tasks that are idiosyncratic for industries, or tasks that are idiosyncratic to certain types
of labor. For the latter type of o⁄shoring, we do have a somewhat counter-intuitive result
that o⁄shoring of tasks that strictly require low-skilled labor raises the domestic wage
for low-skilled labor. The same applies, independently, for o⁄shoring of strictly high-
skill-labor-tasks. As with other results that appear counter-intuitive at ￿rst sight, closer
inspection reveals Stolper-Samuelson logic at work. If the e⁄ective cost of domestic low-
skilled labor falls, because of cheaper availability of low-skilled-labor-tasks sourced abroad,
this bene￿ts the low-skilled-labor-intensive industry more than the other industry, and
the only way to restore zero-pro￿ts is through an o⁄setting rise in the domestic wage for
16See section 4 of Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006b) for more details.
15low-skilled labor. Again, the same logic applies independently for high-skilled-labor-tasks.
And in either case the e⁄ect would be much smaller at ￿early stages￿of o⁄shoring than
for later stages where j￿
i is already ￿large￿ .
A further point relates to welfare and real wages. With strictly input-speci￿c o⁄-
shoring, we would always observe a rise in real wages for both types of labor. O⁄shoring
is a Pareto-improving event. The same does not hold true for industry-speci￿c o⁄shoring
where the Stolper-Samuelson logic applies in a more familiar way. For this type of o⁄-
shoring to be a Pareto-improvement, it would have to be su¢ ciently symmetric in terms
of ^ ￿i!i /(￿i + !i) being not too di⁄erent in absolute magnitude across industries.
And ￿nally, as regards the productivity e⁄ect that has also been the object of em-
pirical analysis,17 in this model all productivity-equivalent gains are absorbed by factor
price changes. It is thus di¢ cult to imagine how productivity gains would show up in an
empirical analysis. Of course, there is much more to data than this model can identify.
In particular, productivity e⁄ects at the industry level may be due to ￿rm heterogene-
ity as in Melitz (2003), which is ruled out here altogether. However, there is a certain
similarity between the new literature on heterogeneity-driven productivity e⁄ects that
work through ￿rm selection. As I have suggested in Kohler (2007), we may re-interpret
our ti(j) schedule as incorporating a varying degree of Ricardian comparative advantage,
driven by productivity-di⁄erences, across di⁄erent tasks, in addition to the o⁄shoring-cost
emphasized above. In this case, enhanced globalization also elicits selection of, and en-
hanced concentration on, tasks where domestic ￿rms have a larger degree of comparative
advantage. Indeed, we may even view our continuum of tasks as also involving a con-
tinuum of di⁄erent ￿rms. The question then remains how to de￿ne productivity in such
a way that we may detect a productivity e⁄ect of o⁄shoring, not in addition to factor
price e⁄ects, but as a di⁄erent, but equivalent, way of observing the same phenomenon
￿ realizing that the factor price e⁄ects are essentially mandated from the productivity
e⁄ects of o⁄shoring.
17See for instance Mann (2003), Mann & Kirkegaard (2006), Amiti & Wei (2005) and G￿rg &
Girma (2004).
164 Globalization: A Less Benign Interpretation
In the preceeding section, the globalization scenario was essentially good news since it
has involved easier access to cheap things from abroad. In this section, I want to take a
somewhat less benign perspective on globalization. Thus, suppose that due to enhanced
world supply of good 1, its price falls on world markets. Domestic ￿rms in industry 1
will perceive this as an increase in competitive pressure, and they will have to adjust.
For the economy as a whole, this requires an adjustment in wage rates, as well as factor
reallocation across industries which may be costly, and may involve temporary unemploy-
ment. From a general equilibrium perspective, in a two-goods-model it only makes sense
to look at the relative price. Without loss of generality, I shall therefore look at a fall in
the relative price of good 1 by normalizing p2 = 1. I do not want to take a stance as to
whether this constitutes a terms-of-trade improvement or a terms-of-trade deterioration,
although one can easily portray the scenario in that way by assuming an appropriate
demand and trade pattern. However, my story is not a terms-of-trade story, but a story
of structural adjustment of a country￿ s production, dictated by some exogenous change
in world market prices. Of course, the story might just as well be told as one of a price
increase, in which case it might look more benign. But globalization here is still less
benign than in the previous section, simply because it now is a two-sided coin, as each
relative price change is, whereas before it was one-sided in that there was an improvement
in technology.
The issue that I want to address is how long-run adjustment of domestic production
evolves in the face of secular changes of comparative advantage, brought about by an
exogenous change in relative prices of traded goods. Of course, adjustment in quantities
and prices are not independent. Both sides adjust simultaneously, and in interdepen-
dence. Indeed, if wages are perfectly ￿ exible, then the wage adjustment might seem more
important for policy than the associated adjustment in quantities in terms of reallocation
and industrial restructuring. But there are important reasons why the quantity side is
important to look at in its own right. First, if the reallocation e⁄ects associated with
adjustment under ￿ exible prices are large, then the unemployment e⁄ect that would arise
in case of wage rigidities is also large. Looking at the quantity side of adjustment is, thus,
a ￿rst and rough way to gauge the potential unemployment problem that may arise from
a certain scenario if wages are rigid. The second reason has to do with adjustment costs,
17which are often assumed away. Short of explicitly modeling such costs, the magnitude
of adjustment in quantities that arise from a given scenario may give a ￿rst and rough
indication of the likely costs of adjustments.
An issue that is not usually addressed, but which may be important, is whether the
long-run decline of a certain industry in terms of employment goes hand in hand with
a gradual reduction also in production depth. One might be inclined to assume that it
does, but the subsequent analysis reveals that the opposite is also possible, whereby an
ever smaller number of people employed in an industry carry out an ever larger set of
tasks, covering an ever larger range of production stages. In a similar vein, if a country
acquires comparative advantage in some industry, will this necessarily happen in the form
of a gradual increase not only in employment, but also in the number of production stages
carried out domestically? Or might the industry increase in size (employment) through
specialization on an ever smaller subset of production stages? Arguably, adjustment costs
may be quite di⁄erent in the two forms of restructuring. I shall not, however, model such
costs explicitly in this paper.
With Leontief-type technology, goods price changes normally do not entail any reallo-
cation at all. Under ￿ exible prices, all adjustment takes place in factor price space, until
￿in the extreme case - one of the two factors has a zero shadow value and production
adjusts in a discrete way towards complete specialization. To allow for a more interesting
story of quantity adjustment, we need to return to the more general model where there
is a systematic variation of skill-intensity across the continuum of tasks in both indus-
tries considered. In this case, o⁄shoring makes the skill-intensity variable. But even if
tasks are homogeneous in terms of skill-intensity, the conclusion from the above analysis
would be that o⁄shoring introduces an element of continuity into adjustment through
the rising cost-schedule ti(j). Moreover, the previous analysis seems to suggest that an
exogenous price increase (reduction) should have the e⁄ect of a reduction (increase) in
o⁄shoring. This follows from the fact that o⁄shoring is the equivalent, in terms of the
zero-pro￿t-conditions, of a price increase. Hence, a price reduction may partly be undone
through o⁄shoring. However, in this section I want to show a special feature of adjust-
ment that arises in the more appealing case where tasks are heterogeneous in terms of
their skill-intensity.
It will prove useful for the subsequent analysis to introduce the following de￿nitions,
relying on the notions of average and marginal skill-intensity introduced in (5) above. I
18shall call industry 1 strongly more skill-intensive than industry 2, if it features both, a
higher average and a higher marginal skill intensity than industry 2, for given external
margins of o⁄shoring, j￿
1 and j￿
2. I call industry 1 weakly more skill intensive, if at the
given levels of j￿
i its average skill intensity is higher, but its marginal skill intensity is
lower than in industry 2￿ s average skill-intensity. And ￿nally, industry 1 is called globally
more skill intensive than industry 2, if its marginal skill intensities over the entire range of
ji 2 [0;1] span a skill-intensity-cone which is disjoint from, and more skill-intensive, than
the corresponding cone for industry 2. It turns out that with this de￿nition, important
qualitative results may be obtained without having to work out a full closed-form-solution
of the comparative statics. Moreover, the di⁄erence between our two forms of o⁄shoring
are also relatively easy to establish. I ￿rst look at the case of industry-speci￿c o⁄shoring
with heterogeneous tasks, followed by a brief treatment of the same scenario for the
alternative concept of o⁄shoring proposed by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006).
It is important a the outset to note that our scenario is an exogenous reduction in
the relative price of a good which is relatively skill-intensive in the average sense. In the
conventional scenario we would expect a decline in employment of both types of labor in
this industry, and a reallocation towards industry 2. This happens through the equilibrium
wage adjustments which make high-skilled labor relatively cheaper, thus making both
industries more skill-intensive. And full employment then requires a contraction of the
more skill-intensive of the two industries. As a ￿rst step, let us thus look at notional wage
adjustments that would maintain the zero-pro￿t conditions in the face of dp1 < 0 without
any change in the margin of o⁄shoring. Assuming diversi￿cation, using (7) this type of
wage adjustment is described by
dp1 = ~ a1h(wh;wl)dwh + ~ a1l(wh;wl)dwl < 0 (17a)
0 = ~ a2h(wh;wl)dwh + ~ a2l(wh;wl)dwl (17b)
where the second equation explicitly states that the price of good two has been normalized
to p2 = 1. Note that by construction of my argument the factor cost for delocalized tasks
on the left-hand side of (7) remain unchanged. We might call it the incipient wage
adjustment. Now suppose that industry 1 is weakly more skill-intensive than industry
2 at the initial levels of o⁄shoring j￿
i and domestic wage rates, wh and wl, respectively.
This means that ~ a1h(￿)/~ a1l(￿) > ~ a2h(￿)/~ a2l(￿) > a1h [j￿
i (wh;wl)]/a1l [j￿
i (wh;wl)], where the
average skill-intensities are de￿ned as in (5) above, and where a1s [j￿
i (wh;wl)] denotes the
19s-type labor input-coe¢ cient at the initial margin j￿
i , with s = h;l. Remember that j￿
i
satis￿es the ￿rst-order-condition of cost-minimization through localization of tasks (10).
Obviously, under these skill-intensity assumptions, the wage changes from (17) feature
a fall in wh and a rise in wl, such that minimum-cost of industry 2 remains constant. Since
the marginal task of industry 1 features a lower skill-intensity than industry 2 does on the
average of its tasks, this implies that the factor cost of that task must rise. The reason is
that a lower skill-intensity makes it less well positioned to gain from a relative reduction of
the high-skilled wage rate. From (10) it then follows that these notional wage adjustments
are no equilibrium reactions, since they violate the ￿rst-order-condition. More speci￿cally,
the rise in wl and fall in wh are such that the domestic economy loses its competitive
edge on the marginal task j￿
i of the skill-intensive industry 1, and cost-minimization
requires that further tasks are delocalized o⁄shore. The same holds true for the less skill-
intensive industry 2, since by de￿nition each industry￿ s average skill-intensity is larger
than its marginal skill-intensity. In other words, equilibrium adjustment in this case
requires enhanced o⁄shoring in both industries. Both industries thus become more skill-
intensive in the process of adjustment, although for ￿small changes￿industry 1 remains
the more skill-intensive of the two on the average of all tasks performed domestically.
The equilibrium wage adjustment is in line with the Stolper-Samuelson logic, although
di⁄erent from that described in equations (17) above.18
The opposite holds true for industry 1, if it is strongly more skill-intensive than indus-
try 2, and a fortiori if it is globally more skill-intensive. In this case we observe a partial
reversal of o⁄shoring in industry 1, since notional the wage adjustment according to (17)
now implies that industry 1 actually gains a competitive edge on the marginal task. The
opposite still holds true for industry 2 (as in the previous case), by de￿nition of the aver-
age skill-intensity in (5). Hence, equilibrium adjustment must now involve less o⁄shoring
in industry 1, and more o⁄shoring in industry 2. As a result, industry 1 becomes less
skill-intensive, while industry 2 becomes more skill-intensive. The factor-intensity e⁄ect of
o⁄shoring thus reduces the skill-intensity di⁄erence between the two industries. This, in
turn, implies that the Stolper-Samuelson logic, although still in force, implies a somewhat
mitigated adjustment, compared to a case where o⁄shoring is ruled out. As regards overall
18In Kohler (2004b), I present a similar analysis using a dual version of a somewhat simpler
model where o⁄shoring takes place only in one of the two industries.
20resource allocation, we lose the Rybczynski-type logic which normally implies contraction
of industry 1 and expansion of industry 2. The reason is that, the factor intensities of the
two industries now move in opposite directions.
To draw a somewhat more general conclusion, it is important to realize the speci￿c
nature of the scenario considered. In our model, industry 1 might be called a comparative
advantage industry, because it is relatively skill-intensive on the average of tasks and
the home economy has relatively cheap high-skilled labor. This industry faces increased
competitive pressure from a fall in the price of good 1. Somewhat paradoxically, the
conventional type of adjustment obtains, if the industry is the less skill-intensive at the
margin of o⁄shoring than the other industry on is average. The intuition is that in this
case the incipient rise in wl and fall in wh harms the industry also at its o⁄shoring margin.
If the industry is skill-intensive also at this margin, then the incipient wage e⁄ects lead to
opposite movements in the skill-intensities of the two industries that mitigate the Stolper-
Samuelson logic and potentially negate the Rybczynski-logic for factor reallocation.
Suppose that we have an exogenous relative price increase of industry 1, rather than a
price reduction. Then the wage e⁄ects described by (17), with dp1 > 0, now go the other
way, with a rise in wh and a fall in wl. Reiterating the logic of the preceding argument, we
would conclude that if industry 1 is weakly more skill-intensive its reaction would involve
a partial reversal of o⁄shoring. The reason is that it is relatively less skill-intensive in
terms of the task at the relevant margin of o⁄shoring, hence it is less a⁄ected by the
changes dwh > 0 and dwl < 0 from (17). The same holds true, by de￿nition of average
skill intensities as in (5), for industry 2. From Rybczynski-type logic, industry 1 expands,
while industry 2 contracts. If industry 1 is strongly more skill-intensive, then these same
wage adjustments would imply that industry 1 loses its competitive edge at the initial
margin of o⁄shoring, and would therefore react by delocalizing more tasks o⁄shore, while
the opposite holds true for industry 2. Thus, adjustment implies an increase in factor-
intensity di⁄erences. The result is that the Stolper-Samuelson logic gets reinforced, and
the Rybczynski-type logic is lost, potentially at least.
The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis for empirical work is that it makes
relatively little sense to search for an unambiguous relationship between changes in the
extent of an industry￿ s level of o⁄shoring, and changes in employment or more generally its
level of activity. Everything depends on the type of exogenous shock that drives the data.
O⁄shoring and employment, together with the wage e⁄ects, are all jointly endogenous,
21and ignoring this endogeneity in the estimation process, without bothering about the type
of exogenous shock that generates the variation observed in the data, leads to potentially
meaningless results.
The preceding analysis indicates a rich pattern of possible industrial restructuring in a
country that faces a change in world prices for traded ￿nal goods, and whose ￿rms engage
in o⁄shoring to countries where low-skilled labor is relatively cheap. The underlying as-
sumption was that o⁄shoring is an industry-speci￿c phenomenon involving heterogeneous
tasks. A somewhat simpler pattern of restructuring obtains, if o⁄shoring is speci￿c to
inputs as proposed by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006). Without going into details,
I want to show in what follows why things are di⁄erent and simpler in this alternative
world. Changes in relative wages within the domestic economy, a key channel of the
e⁄ects considered in this section, are entirely irrelevant for o⁄shoring. Industrial restruc-
turing caused by price changes does involve changes in o⁄shoring, however, also in the
GR-model. From (16), the domestic factor cost for tasks, whSh [j￿
h(wh)] and wlSl [j￿
l (wl)]
responds in the familiar way to goods price changes. With given foreign wage rates and
given o⁄shoring margins j￿
i , this disturbs the o⁄shoring condition. By necessity, it does
so in both sectors, and the o⁄shoring margins of the two industries will always move in
the same direction.
More speci￿cally, from (16), the factor cost changes following a change in p1 must
satisfy the familiar magni￿cation relationship of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. I.e.,
under the assumption that industry 1 is relatively skill intensive, ^ p1 < 0 must be associated
with a fall in whSh [j￿
h(wh)], and a rise in wlSl [j￿
l (wl)]. Now, since the extensive margins
j￿
s are increasing in the respective wage rates, and S0
s < 0, and since we now assume a
constant o⁄shoring-cost and a constant foreign wage rate, a fall in wh will be associated
with a rise in Sh, i.e., a partial reversal o⁄shoring. This is intuitive, since a lower domestic
wage for high-skilled labor makes the domestic economy competitive at the initial margin
of o⁄shoring. Whether or not this is an equilibrium adjustment depends on whether it is
true that ^ wh + !h^ |￿
h < 0, with ^ wh < 0. From the ￿rst order condition of o⁄shoring which
in this case states that ￿ wh = wh=[￿hzh(j￿
h)], we have ^ |￿
h = ^ wh=￿h. Hence the condition is
satis￿ed, if ^ wh(1 + !h=￿h) < 0, which in turn implies !h=￿h > ￿1, which is equivalent to
￿h > ￿!h, or ￿h > j!hj. Now, we know that ￿h > 0 and !h < 0; and in section 3 above
we have also shown that the equivalent of condition ￿h > j!hj is satis￿ed for the industry-
speci￿c notion of o⁄shoring. By analogy, it is also satis￿ed in the present context. From
22all of this it then follows that, for an equilibrium adjustment to ^ p1 < 0, we do have ^ wh < 0
with ^ Sh > 0 , and conversely for low-skilled labor where ^ wl > 0 and ^ Sl < 0. We may thus
conclude that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem remains valid in qualitative terms for the
Grossman-Rossi-Hansberg world of o⁄shoring.19
For the reallocation e⁄ects it is now important to realize that the full employment
conditions are given by
a1hSh [j
￿
h(wh)]y1 + a2hSh [j
￿
h(wh)]y2 = Lh (18a)
a1lSl [j
￿
l (wl)]y1 + ai2Sl [j
￿
l (wl)]y2 = Ll (18b)
From the previous paragraph we know that Sh is rising, while Sl is falling, in iden-
tical ways for both industries. Denoting the familiar employment shares by ￿is :=
aisSs [j￿
s(ws)]yi/Ls, we may write the relative changes as
￿1h^ y1 + (1 ￿ ￿1h)^ y2 = ￿^ Sh < 0 (19a)
￿1l^ y1 + (1 ￿ ￿1l)^ y2 = ￿^ Sl > 0 (19b)
From this, we may directly conclude that output levels respond as in the Rybczynski-type
magni￿cation e⁄ect: ^ y1 < ￿^ Sh < 0 < ￿^ Sl < ^ y2. This is as expected. However, it relates
to ￿nal output levels, not to employment of labor in the two industries. As emphasized
above, overall employment in industry 1 falls, as perhaps expected, if both industries
become more skill-intensive in the process of adjustment, with the skill-intensity measured
as aihSh [j￿
h(wh)]/(ailSl [j￿
l (wl)]). Since ^ Sh < 0 < ￿^ Sl, i.e., since both industries conduct
more o⁄shoring of low-skilled tasks and a partial o⁄shoring-reversal of high-skilled tasks,
this condition is unambiguously satis￿ed, and the employment reaction is in line with
the traditional model and plain intuition. More competitive pressure on the ￿nal output
side of industry 1 leads to a contraction, not only of gross output, but also of domestic
employment of both factors in that industry. The reverse happens in industry 2. Notice
that we are experiencing a certain degree of gradualism in resource reallocation where
without o⁄shoring we would have no reaction up to a point, with a subsequent discrete
jump to complete specialization.
19See also Baldwin & Robert-Nicaud (2007).
235 Conclusion
Stories of o⁄shoring di⁄er for two non-trivial reasons. First, the underlying view of the
o⁄shoring phenomenon may di⁄er, and secondly, the scenario looked at in theoretical
models, or the exogenous changes behind the data used in empirical work, may di⁄er. If
these di⁄erences are made explicit, then the di⁄erent stories should not cause confusion.
However, in empirical work at least, this is often not the case. And theoretical models
usually subscribe, more or less arbitrarily, to a speci￿c, single notion of o⁄shoring. More-
over, they mostly look at scenarios where o⁄shoring arises (sometimes from a case without
o⁄shoring to start with) due to an exogenous reduction of o⁄shoring-costs. O⁄shoring as
an ingredient to adjustment of other types of shocks has received little attention. The
empirical literature very often investigates the e⁄ects of o⁄shoring on variables like wages
and employment which are jointly endogenous with o⁄shoring itself. If two variables
are jointly endogenous, their co-movement depends on the type of exogenous shock that
drives this movement. Unless the researcher is explicit about this, results are di¢ cult to
interpret, and one should not be too surprised that the stories reported di⁄er.
In this paper, I have identi￿ed two di⁄erent types of o⁄shoring that are both amenable
to general equilibrium analysis featuring several types of labor and may, thus, be com-
pared in a rigorous way for the same type of scenario, focusing on distribution and factor
allocation. Moreover, I have looked at two di⁄erent scenarios to exemplify that the co-
movement of o⁄shoring on the one hand, and wages and employment on the other heavily
depends on the type of underlying shock.
O⁄shoring may be related to tasks that are speci￿c to certain types of labor. All
types of labor may be subject to o⁄shoring, but the tasks of low-skilled labor may be
delocalized independently from the tasks performed by high-skilled labor. This is the
￿new paradigm￿of trade proposed recently by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006). Al-
ternatively, o⁄shoring may be seen as an industry-speci￿c phenomenon where the smallest
unit of production that may be delocalized still involves bundles of many (or all) types
of labor. It is then impossible to delocalize inputs of low-skilled labor independently of
high-skilled labor. This type of o⁄shoring has been looked at in earlier literature, but the
two types have not been analyzed and compared in a uni￿ed framework.
I have analyzed these two phenomena in a uni￿ed way, relying on Grossman & Rossi-
Hansberg (2006), focusing on factor cost savings of delocalization. But in addition to
24their scenario of a lower o⁄shoring-cost, I have also looked at a case where o⁄shoring is
part of an industrial adjustment caused by a change in prices for tradable ￿nal goods,
given exogenously from world markets. Among the results obtained, o⁄shoring of low-
skilled tasks always raises the wage for low-skilled labor, as emphasized by Grossman &
Rossi-Hansberg (2006), independently on factor intensity relationship between industries
concerned. However, for the other type of o⁄shoring factor intensity rankings do play a
role, whereby a key distinction arises between the marginal and the average skill-intensity
of an industry.
More interesting di⁄erences arise if one looks at the employment and factor price e⁄ects
of a change in ￿nal goods prices. More speci￿cally, if o⁄shoring involves heterogeneous
tasks involving bundles of both types of labor, then contraction or expansion of an industry
caused by such price changes may take place in the same direction at both the extensive
and intensive margin of adjustment. But, depending on the skill intensity di⁄erence
between the industries concerned, contraction of total employment in an industry may
go hand in hand with expansion at the extensive margin, meaning a partial reversal of
o⁄shoring. Indeed, adjustment no longer needs to be in line with the familiar Rybczynski-
type magni￿cation e⁄ect. However, adjustment takes more mainstream forms if o⁄shoring
is of the other type where tasks relate to single types of labor.
For empirical work, my analysis suggests that the speci￿cation of estimation equa-
tions for both, wage and employment e⁄ects, and the speci￿c estimation technique cho-
sen, should be sensitive with respect to the fact that o⁄shoring, as well as wages and
employment, are all jointly endogenous. Moreover, the empirical approach should allow
for a distinction between the two types of o⁄shoring. For the industry-speci￿c form of
o⁄shoring, the speci￿c ways in which industry-characteristics determine the wage and
employment e⁄ects identi￿ed in the present analysis should be, and can be, taken into
account in the empirical speci￿cation.
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